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Wednesday, March 19, 2008

„« Can the national identity

Ø      Can the national identity ¡§develop into¡¨ a European one? Is a ¡§metamorphosis¡¨ a viable entity?   (Trying to expand the theory exploring a transmitted concept from a national to a European identity. - Maybe there is no need to be "transformed", but as national identity is a changeable social concept needs to "add" a European element into its character).

 
The collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe and the emergence of a completely new geopolitical and social reality, which is strikingly different from its forerunner, probably represented the most important breakthrough in modern world history, by far exceeding the limitations of their regional boundaries and the relatively brief period of time (Kreutz, 1999).
 
Nobody expected that the integration of the European countries would transcend the original idea of an economic merger and extend to include a single monetary unit thereby allowing other facets such as the unification of national identities in order to create a single Europe. However, the viability of a cultural integration is hotly debated in the literature as countries struggle to retain their own cultural lineage and countries such as Germany and France wrestle in the cultural dominance of their own race. There is one possible resolution of this issue; a gradual evolution of a European culture that is founded on both the different nature of the nations comprising the EC and the emerging culture that is responsive to the changing world and the changing nature of Europe.
 
Generally, for a country to gain entry in the European Community, one needs to regulate and amend its standards in order to conform to a hegemonic norm founded on the differing cultures and perspective of several nation-states. The dilemma starts at the point where some European countries fails or refuses to submit to this ¡§higher power¡¨. As in all other integration and cooperation, the consensus of the members usually seeks the middle ground. This is for two reasons: extremist ideas and propositions may alienate the other member states that also have some strong stand and second, cooperation entails an atmosphere of bargaining and compromise; it shies away from evoking emotional and extremist ideals. This will also prevent to some extent the dominance of a certain nation in the community.
 
Something has happened between 1957 and 1992 to the meaning, implications and applicability of the time-honoured concept of sovereignty; and in Europe, much of this has been due to the impact of the European Community (EC) on the status of the nation-state (Zetterholm, 1994; pp 14). However, there are also counteracting tendencies. Some are connected with the across-the-board resurgence of nationalism in Europe. Others stern from reactions to EC integration as proposed in the 'federalist' Maastricht scenario (Zetterholm, 1994; pp 14). It could be argued that, increasingly, political and postmodernist scholarly pronouncements on the irrelevance or demise of sovereignty are being offset by practical popular pronouncements to the contrary -- though 'sovereignty' is often not the actual term used.
 
There are thus many different positions regarding culture as a factor influencing political and economic integration in Europe, and different opinions as to the degree of cultural diversity and the importance of that cultural diversity for the integration processes (Zetterholm, 1994; pp 14; pp 15). In many of the most influential integration theories, concerning both economic and political integration, the focus is upon how institutional and policy changes lead to changes in the actions and interactions of the actors in the system (Zetterholm, 1994; pp 15). Within mainstream economic theory the basic assumption is that rational actors will adapt to new situations in order to maximize their utility and exploit the new possibilities.
 
In many of the most influential integration theories, concerning both economic and political integration, the focus is upon how institutional and policy changes lead to changes in the actions and interactions of the actors in the system (Zetterholm, 1994; pp 15). Within mainstream economic theory the basic assumption is that rational actors will adapt to new situations in order to maximize their utility and exploit the new possibilities. One way to make the latter approach credible is to emphasize cultural variety against the background of a common cultural base, a common European civilisation. In a way one could say that the whole EC integration project's implicit starting point is that cultural diversity does not necessarily lead to such cleavages between the nations as to block further integration, and that the lower levels of functional cooperation pave the way for more comprehensive common policies and institutions by changing the mental readiness to transgress national borders and national concepts There are thus many different positions regarding culture as a factor influencing political and economic integration in Europe, and different opinions as to the degree of cultural diversity and the importance of that cultural diversity for the integration processes (Zetterholm, 1994; pp 14; pp 15).
 
The people ¡Vfor instance- in East and Central Europe must have a perplexed notion, as they cognise that they belong culturally and historically to Europe, although they are not in the European Union. G. Ash described it successfully: ¡§Poles, Czechs and Hungarians had kept insisting: but Europe is larger than that! We may be poor cousins, but we still belong to the family!¡¨ [1] Thus, the issue of who will be included and who should be excluded is still vague.  Further, it should be mentioned that the South-East-Central Europe ¡Vfor many reasons that vary from the historical to economical point of view had an absent from the situation of progress and of course, the rest of Europe couldn¡¦t wait.
 
Many observers interested in the dynamics and the future of the European Community single out one aspect of Western Europe, namely its cultural diversity, as sufficient reason for a pessimistic assessment of the future of EC integration. The differences in mentality, traditions, ways of life and social institutions between the Western European countries are so large that higher levels of integration 'creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe' seem unlikely There are thus many different positions regarding culture as a factor influencing political and economic integration in Europe, and different opinions as to the degree of cultural diversity and the importance of that cultural diversity for the integration processes (Zetterholm, 1994; pp 14; pp 15).
 
A European identity already exists; although, it has to be formed more accurately. The reason is the confusion that becomes visible among Europeans about their common future in relation with the Europeanisation and furthermore the globalisation. It is arguable that the analysis of the construction of a national identity would be comparable with the European one. In the same way that each European nation tried to establish their own identity, maybe the European identity could be established, without -at the same time- the national identities to be demolished. The integrity, in the case of the European identity, is that it could not be shaped by one culture but by the diversity of the European panel. European identity has to take into consideration the fact that Europe consists of a variety of cultures and a diversity of national and regional minorities.
 
An identity consists of 1) memory (e.g. on war, formation of nations, on national cultures, historical experiences, political culture), 2) heritages (monuments, memorials etc), 3) institution (common institutions, for the benefit of the citizens) and 4) a sense of common future. It could be supported that identity and with it diversity, is manifested on various levels, such a local, a national level and an international-European level. As a result, the coexistence of national cultures leads up to perceive European culture as a multicultural one.
 
In the new world order of super-national entities like the European Union, national identity and national history appears as just one of many choices, not the prime choice, possible to explain the past.
 
Schuman,  one of the founding fathers of the European Community of Coal and Steel, in 1963 wrote: ¡§Before becoming a military alliance or an economy entity, Europe has to be a cultural community in the highest sense of the word¡¨ (in Myths + Nationhood, Hosking-Schopflin, p. 60). Naturally, this asseveration is contradicted by the patent reality of political and cultural differences across the continent. On the other hand, it is not an utopian conception. Furthermore, as the national identity is concerned it is arguable that it exists in East and West equally, yet the interpretation is quite different.  
 
Central and East European countries hope to be fully integrated soon in the European community, the European Union, and they are right to expect integration in the near future because of their common history and culture (Peck, 1996). In view of recent political developments, there is no time to lose. In some countries, the old political powers are again gaining influence (Peck, 1996).
 
An attempt to ¡§identify¡¨ the identity within culture would come to the result that ¡§the former is a matter of knowledge and the later is the specific content of such knowledge¡¨. (The Politics of Culture. Frank Pfetsch, europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/university/gov/das/PFETSCHtexte2). Culture is socially constructed thereby implicating that nationalism is grounded on how the people have moulded themselves and their heritage. As such, the European Community also evolved on this premise. Thus, identity is also a social construct. This implies that the gradual integration of Europe will eventually be instituted in the socialization process and thus, in the consciousness of the Europeans.
 
The EC started with small independent states that later merged. This implies that these small states already have their own values, beliefs and behaviours they adhere to. Thus, small counties are an essential component of Europe. They became the building blocks and the foundation of a diverse community that strives to integrate. This variety has also been beneficial in the evolution of modern Europe.
 
Before 1989, Europeans felt themselves to be part either of the West or of the East, according to where they lived, but scarcely took the matter any further (www.coe.int/T/E/Communication , p.1 roman kist, adviser to the Luxembourg government). This association is deeply rooted in the different political orientation between the East and the West. The social identification stems from the contrasting situation between the East and the West at the time. However, they have successfully eradicated to a large degree this identification.
 
As it was mentioned before the foundations of the national identities of every country is based on a number of considerations including the historical and social experiences of these countries. A common element in the search for a modern national identity is the identification of each country with Europe. Besides the problematic position and clarification of what do we mean by Europe, the East and West concept is raised.
 
The expansion of a national identity to encompass the culture of its member states, has to be found in a combination of historical past, the experiences of the 20th century particularly the search for economic growth, geographical position, ethnic composition and cultural heritage. The individual identification for each county with Europe is part of this process.
 
For instance, the Romanian national identity is closely associated with the feeling of the country being a great European nation, not because Romanians necessarily see their country as a future big member state of the Union, but rather because of the resolute identification of Romanian national identity with European culture¡¨. ( Survey of National Identity, Working paper 1998, europa.eu.int/comm/cdp/working-paper/survey_of_national_identity.pdf. ). In contrast, the Czech national identity is based on a feeling of a historical belonging to mainstream European developments: ¡§geographically it occupies a central position in Europe and economically it used to be an integrated and dynamic part of Europe. National identity under the Klaus-regime was deliberately constructed on a perception that the Czech Republic was more advanced the other CEECs in terms of macro-economic performance and political stability (Survey of National Identity, Working paper 1998, europa.eu.int/comm/cdp/working-paper/survey_of_national_identity.pdf.- Dasckalov, Building up).
 
The Hungarians share the pathos of the Poles that joining the EU is synonymous with regaining the country¡¦s (historically) rightful position in Europe. ¡§The general atmosphere in Hungary today does not indicate any deep-rooted opposition to European integration, nor does there seem to be any conflict between national identity and European unification. Nevertheless, fears are sometimes expressed about the survival of the Hungarian language and cultural specificity in view of the strong harmonising drive of a homogeneous European ¡§super-culture¡¨. With time, however, the Hungarian elite has become increasingly confident about the country¡¦s progress in terms of economic and democratic transition, and now expects the EU to prepare itself in order to accommodate a number of new member states ( Survey of National Identity, Working paper 1998, europa.eu.int/comm/cdp/working-paper/survey_of_national_identity.pdf.- Dasckalov, Building up).
 
Poles consider themselves as having always been part of mainstream Europe and having contributed to its development. In this sense, joining the EU is seen as a confirma5tion of the European integration could undermine national sovereignty (Survey of National Identity, Working paper 1998, europa.eu.int/comm/cdp/working-paper/survey_of_national_identity.pdf.- Dasckalov, Building up).¡§Although, the Yugoslav regime was not oppressive to the same degree as the Soviet regime, there was a distinct feeling in Slovenia that escaping from Yugoslavia and Communism was synonymous with fleeing to the West. Since independence, as national identity came to the forefront, a much higher value was attached to close identification with Europe than identification with the Balkans. The latter was linked to everything bad, while the former was dressed only in positive attributes but there is also a fear that European integration could erode national sovereignty and dilute Slovene identity¡¨ (Survey of National Identity, Working paper 1998, europa.eu.int/comm/cdp/working-paper/survey_of_national_identity.pdf.- Dasckalov, Building up).
 
Besides there is the vital question that when it comes in countries like Slovakia maybe the process of European integration is premature. As there is a limited experience of national independence consequently, there are some difficulties.
 
Of course, there is the concern between these countries not to become second class members of the EU confined to participation in peripheral areas and with limited access to hard core decision-making. Maybe here is the important role of the institutions. If there is a clear national consciousness then could come to the level of ¡§good Europeans¡¨ (Smith, 1991).
 
Given the current financial and educational preoccupations of the member states, it would be easy to become "Eurocentric" and preoccupied solely with strengthening and consolidating the EU (Peck, 1996). While this is clearly important, the many internal challenges currently facing the EU must not be allowed to overshadow the continuing challenge of expansion and the development of ever-closer links with the countries of Eastern Europe and beyond.
 
Public opinion in Europe would seem to support such developments. The public opinion survey Eurobarometer reported in autumn 1995 that the majority of citizens of the EU (56%) thought that, within the next 15 years, an expansion to include other European countries "such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, or Slovakia" will have become a reality (Peck, 1996). Those questioned in the Scandinavian countries were noticeably positive. In contrast, those who thought that such enlargement would not be a reality by the year 2010 included many in France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium (Peck, 1996). In fact, there are currently nine countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, and Slovakia) that have already signed agreements with the EU that are designed to lead to membership (Peck, 1996).
 
These recent developments indicates that there is indeed a growing consensus on the part of the members and non-members of the European Community to consciously adhere and compromise national identities in favour of European culture. In addition, this paves the way for European countries ready to evolve in lieu with the gains and the advantages they can obtain from joining the European Community. While national identity is the bulwark of these states, the reality that sooner or later boundaries will be totally wiped and a global village will emerge is not a far-fetched idea. With this compromise, the Europeanisation process may be resting on stable grounds.
 
 
References:
 
Zetterholm, S. 1994. National Cultures and European Integration: Exploratory Essays on Cultural Diversity and Common Policies. Berg Publishers Ltd.
 
Kreutz, A. 1999. Post-communist Eastern Europe and the Middle East: the burden of history and new political realities. Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21.
 
Peck, B. 1996. The European Union faces east. Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. 78.
 
 


[1] Garton Ash,: Is Europe becoming Europe:  Sanford S. Elberg Lecture; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley. 2001,  http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/Elberg/GartonAsh/ga-elb04.html .
 


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